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Chapter 7 – Mobile and fatal: The EU borders
Nicolas LAMBERT 
CNRS – UMS RIATE
 Olivier CLOCHARD 
MIGRINTER, Poitiers, France
The tragedy of October 3, 2013, off the coast of Lampedusa (Italy), in which 306 men, women and
children  died  while  fleeing  countries  devastated  by  war  or  dictatorships  (Eritrea,  Ethiopia  and
Somalia, among others) in search of a better life, reminds us of the cruel fate that has confronted
tens of thousands of migrants each year – for the past two decades – in the Mediterranean region.
However, few can remember the case of the 19-year-old Afghan migrant found dead August 13,
2012, on the banks of the Evros (the river on the border between Greece and Turkey) in the region
of Marasiai, or the 22 Africans who fell overboard from their boat during heavy winds off the coast
of  Almeriaii in  the  south  of  Spain.  The  European  Union  and  its  member  states  with  their
warmongering practices are among those who are primarily responsible for such disasters that have
led to the deaths of thousands of people in the Mediterranean Sea. However, in the Mediterranean
region and beyond, the violence in a majority of cases leads to deaths, without there being any
contact  between the respective authorities responsible for border controls and their  victims. Far
from being a linear border that would separate an inside from an outside, this ‘migratory border’ is,
by  contrast,  vague,  mobile,  reticular  and  asymmetrical.  This  is  far  more  than  an  institutional
separation  between  sovereign  territories:  What  is  under  construction  here  is  an  intrinsically
(geo)political border marked by the dominant relations between states and imposed by the EU on its
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neighbors.
Since the establishment of  the Schengen Area in the 1990s, European migratory policy has been
guided by a willingness to control and stop foreigners who do not have valid travel or residential
visas, and by the fight against terrorismiii. Since 2002, cooperation between member states aiming to
develop and strengthen controls at  external  borders has strengthened and gathered speed.  In its
communication from May 2002 titled Towards an integrated management of the external borders of
the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union, the  European  Commission  laid  out  some  of  the
fundamental requirements of this policy ‘to possess the means of combating terrorism, guarantee a
higher level of security inside the EU after enlargement (…) and increase the effectiveness of the
fight against illegal immigration while respecting the principles of the right to asylum.’ This resolve
of member states gave way to a number of new provisions that were subsequently put into place,
namely  a  plurality  of  migratory  control  methods  that  exemplify  the  multiple  borders  of  the
Mediterranean.
In  2004,  the  immigration  liaison  officers’  networkiv, which  participates  in  the  enactment  of
European migratory policy in the countries neighboring the EU and beyond, was put into place;
since 2005, Frontex  (the European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the
external borders of the member states of the European Union) uses radar, thermal imaging cameras,
ships, helicopters, planes and will soon use drones, too, from the Strait of Gibraltar to Cyprus via
the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. From 2011, Eurosur, a coordinated surveillance system, relies
on innovative technology to militarize the external borders of the EU and thus limit the number of
‘illegal’ immigrants from entering. These different provisions produce complex assemblages (Allen
& Cochrane, 2010) and are consequently marked by a constant evolution that gives the impression
of ‘migratory borders’ that are constantly moving and reconstructing themselves.
The aim of this  article  is to describe and analyze these border schemes in accordance with the
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questions concerning the people who die in the process of migration, and to see how these border
controls are responsible – either directly or indirectly – for the deaths of migrants at the borders and
how they influence the displacement of these tragedies. This article will also present the advantages
of  a  quantitative  approach,  which  is  made possible  by the clustering  of  these situations  in  the
Mediterranean Sea. This approach allows the creation of brand-new cartographic representations of
what can call be referred to as a ‘border hotspot’ in order to give a new perception of this border,
not to be seen as a limit between two territories but rather as a space between these two zones: a
completely separate space where personal stories and tragedies occur. The article is original in that
it bases its analysis on the social, political and spatial interaction surrounding the maritime area over
which the borders of the Mediterranean Sea stretch out, giving it an unprecedented complexity.  
1. The fluctuating and restrictive aspects of European border regimes
1.1 The expansion of border zones under the impetus of international agreements
With  the signing of multiple  international  agreements  between the EU’s member  states  and its
neighboring countries, which seek to return or drive back ‘illegal’ immigrants, the relocation of
border controls has been strengthened considerably. These agreements  can be bilateral  (such as
Spain-Morocco, Italy-Libya) or include the entire European community. Since 2002, the Justice and
Home Affairs Council (JHA) has made it one its priorities to establish readmission agreements with
those countries that share a border with the EU and also with those from where there are a large
number of migrants (Morocco, Turkey) into the union. There is also the European Neighbourhood
Policy  (ENP),  where  migration  and border  controls  are  two important  topics.  More  ‘technical’
agreements, like those that the European agency Frontex has signed with countries such as Turkey
or that they are trying to negotiate with countries such as Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco,
Mauritania and Senegal, underline the willingness of the EU to establish a buffer zone over the
entire southern part of the Mediterranean region. Moreover, in its annual report from 2012, Frontex
141
emphasized that while the European Commission is primarily interested in creating a dialogue on
migration, mobility and security with these countries, the agency ‘was active in developing contacts
with the competent  authorities  of  these countries  and looking to  initiate  formal  negotiations  to
conclude  working  arrangements  where  appropriate’v.  Through  these  different  issues  relating  to
European migratory controls operating in the countries of origin and to the transit of migrants, the
mechanisms aimed at fighting ‘illegal immigration’ are based on a ‘plurality of actors in outposts
who relate to a trend of leverage and invisibility of borders at the mercy of the deployment of
controls’ (Blanchard, Clochard, & Rodier, 2010, p. 5). For example, Moroccan and Spanish police
forces closely collaborate on surveillance in the Strait of Gibraltar, and return migrants to Morocco
who have reached the sovereign territories  of Ceuta and Melilla.  Between May and September
2012, hundreds of migrants who had invaded these populated Spanish exclaves situated in close
proximity to the Moroccan coastline, were deported to Morocco. On February 6, 2014, the Guardia
Civil and the Moroccan police fended off nearly 300 people of sub-Saharan origin who were trying
to reach the sovereign territory of Ceuta. ‘Some of these migrants jumped into the sea in order to try
and reach the beach at Tarajal. At least 15 people drowned (…) others were declared missing’vi.
With this  latest  tragedy, the Spanish authorities reached a new level in the escalation of border
controls  by installing anti-climbing nets on the metal  fences  that  surround Ceuta and Melillavii.
Political  desire  and  the  pressure  on  the  European  Union’s  member  states  to  control  illegal
immigrants are such that for roughly the past decade, it has implicitly ordered actions on the part of
border control agencies that are sometimes irreversible. Several testimonies mention that the Greek
coastguard could be responsible for the sinking of migrant boats in the Aegean Seaviii. It has also
been reported  in  the  Spanish  daily  newspaper  El Paísix that  in  April  2008,  off  the coast  of  Al
Hoceima in the northeast of Morocco, Moroccan soldiers were alleged to have deliberately used a
knife to puncture an inflatable dinghy that had 70 migrants onboard trying to reach Spain. Thirty-six
of them were either declared missing or found dead.  
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1.2 Sea borders: contiguous zones …
Thus, migratory surveillance of member states takes place in numerous border regions where the
work of the border control agencies is made easier by there being no one to stop the forced return of
migrants. If some of these actions by border forces took place in the middle of a desert like in
Morocco, to the south of Oujda, or at the Mauritanian border where migrants are abandoned and left
by the Moroccan police, the sea borders are also the scene for forced returns that take place outside
any legal framework. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982),
which came into force in 1994, affirms that coastal states have contiguous zones, which can cover
an area up to 24 nautical miles from the coast (territorial waters plus contiguous zone), where the
competent  authorities  have  the  right  to  repress  any  violation  of  their  national  legislation  on
immigration. Regardless of whether this contiguous zone is demarcated or not, in numerous cases
the migratory controls take place well beyond the established 24 nautical miles.
In  this  regard,  the  surveillance  operations  that  took  place  in  international  waters  and  were
coordinated by Frontex raise multiple questions ‘regarding the compatibility between the operation
of this agency with the respect of migrant’s rights and notably the right to asylum. For example, in
June 2009, as part of an agency operation, the Italian coastguard, assisted by a German helicopter,
intercepted  75  people  aboard  a  small  boat  and  then  returned  them  to  the  Libyan  authorities.
Following this event, the assistant director of Frontex said the agency would not take responsibility
for the risks faced by those people who are sent back, and it was not able confirm that their right to
asylum and human rights  were being respected in  Libya’x. This event became the subject  of a
complaint filed in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that condemned Italy, in February
2012,  for  the  violation  of  the  principle  of  non-refoulementxi.  Despite  this  decision,  European
authorities continue their operations. This is proved by the story of migrants from Somalia held in
the Toweisha camp near Tripoli in June 2012, who said that after five days of crossing the waters
and they had nearly reached the coast of Malta, they were retrieved by some boats who handed
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them  over  to  the  Libyan  coastguard,  which  subsequently  detained  them  in  this  camp.  These
practices violate the principle of non-refoulement set out by the Geneva Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, which prohibits the deportation of foreigners to a country where they risk being
subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishmentxii. The regulation on
maritime surveillance, adopted in the spring of 2014, is in the process of legitimizing these practices
as the text makes reference to sending back migrants stopped in international waters.
1.3 … to the treatment of ‘illegal passengers’ aboard ships
In Europe, border crossings by foreigners without valid documents is being criminalized more and
more, which means immigration is often associated with a criminal offensexiii. Consequently, for
around  the  past  30  years,  European  governments  have  developed  laws  aiming  to  legalize  the
detention of migrants.  In 2011, the Migreuropxiv network took a census of nearly 420 detention
centers inside the EU and neighboring countries; however, there is also a multitude of areas that are
often invisible and not featured on the map (Migreurop, 2011). The structures of these places are not
clear and can be understood with great difficulty as they vary greatly. Also despite their different
sizes, these situations can be perennial or temporary and sometimes even ‘mobile’.
For example, in August 2013, following an application from the Italian authorities, the Salami oil
tanker, flying the Libyan flag, rescued 102 ‘boat people’ in distress 46.6 nautical miles off the coast
of Libya and 140 nautical miles off the coast of Malta – the destination of the ship. However, at 24
nautical miles from its destination, the Maltese army ordered the tanker to stop and told the captain
to return to the port of Khoms, situated 120 kilometers to the east of Tripoli, where the ship had
come from and was the closest port to the rescue zone where the migrants could disembark xv. ‘The
Captain refused and pressed Malta to receive these migrants and even the European Commission
(EC) ordered Malta to let these people disembark from the ship in order to answer the humanitarian
emergency in this situation’xvi. This is not an isolated case. In July 2013, Cecilia Malmström, the
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European commissioner, had already highlighted her growing concerns regarding the comments
made by the Maltese prime minister  on the possibility  of  returning migrants  who had recently
arrived in Malta, and she also asked the Maltese authorities to take the necessary measures in order
to respect the right to asylum and the principle of non-refoulementxvii. Several newspaper articles
have mentioned similar  cases: On the same night of the August 4 and 5, 2013, a Turkish ship,
Adakent, had to disembark 96 people in Tripolixviii. In May 2012, two merchant ships helped boat
people off the coast of Libya before disembarking them in Tripoli,  following instructions  from
Rome.
There are also the cases of other ships, like those from Frontex or the Spanish navy under the
banner of NATO: On July 11, 2011, the Almirante Juan de Borbón rescued over 100 ‘boat people’
of sub-Saharan origin,  as well  as some Tunisians and Libyans; however, they were not granted
permission to disembark in Malta or Italyxix. Consequently, the people had to stay aboard for six
days,  until  a Tunisian military vessel took responsibility  for them and they could disembark in
Tunisia.  
Hence,  irrespective  of  the  status  of  the  ship  that  rescues  these  boat  people, they  often  find
themselves confined to the ship before being disembarked in neighboring countries such as Libya or
Tunisia. Therefore after having assisted these people who were shipwrecked, the rescue boat plays a
role in the detention and ultimately the violation of the principle of non-refoulement of asylum
seekers. Therefore, is the ultimate ‘mobile border’ not bound by the measures put into place for the
ships of the merchant navy?  
1.4 Waiting areas (transit zones) at ports
In reference to waiting areas (transit zones) at European ports, we can observe the diversity of the
layouts of border areas that occur over time so that border controls can be more effective and are
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not challenged by the justice system when it has to intervene.
The legislation relating to the upkeep of waiting areas (transit zones) in France has continued to
evolve over time. Today, there is a measure that is movable, namely a sort of resiliency of borders.
Since  its  creation,  in  1992,  the  waiting  area  (transit  zone)  has  been  limited  to  areas  of
disembarkation  and  areas  where  controls  were  operated  and may  have  included  buildings  that
provided ‘hotel type services’. The courts where the migrants were taken in order to extend their
stay were not considered to be part of this waiting area (transit zone). There was a regular debate
between the legislator, civil servants, judges and NGOs to establish whether these places were part
or not of waiting areas (transit zones). In 2003, this controversy was settled by a law that explained
that thenceforth, these waiting areas (transit zones) would ‘stretch, without there needing to be a
particular decision, to the places in which the migrant must go either in the case of an ongoing legal
process, either in the case of medical needs.’ The provisions introduced in 2011 strengthened this
procedure and aimed to answer similar situations to the one that happened off the coast of Corsica
in January 2010, when 123 Kurds were disembarked outside official border points. These areas can
now be created ‘when it is obvious that a group of at least 10 migrants arrive in France outside a
normal border crossing.’ As a result,  these areas can now be created anywhere on the territory.
These migrants who have just arrived in a specific territory can be in ‘the same place or in a group
of distinct places within a 10-kilometer radius.’ The existence of these waiting areas (transit zones)
is only temporary, as their maximum duration cannot exceed 26 days. Such a manipulation of the
law for the purposes of migratory controls falls under the ‘delinearization’ process of state limits
that started during the 1990s.
Regarding the controls themselves, even though there are laws that strive to prohibit the registration
of ‘illegal passengers’ aboard ships, numerous examples (Migreurop, 2011) demonstrate that these
practices still  exist and lead to the deaths of migrants. One of the latest tragedies took place in
January 2014 in Marseille. In order to avoid returning by boat, two Guineans jumped overboard
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from the ship that had been detaining them for nearly a month, and one of them drowned. During
their  preceding  stopovers  (Antwerp  in  Belgium,  Setúbal  in  Portugal  and Genoa  in  Italy),  port
authorities had refused their disembarkation and registration of their asylum application.
‘The migratory border is (…) [therefore] extremely stretched and marginal; it will
not stop evolving at the mercy of these different circumstances. For around the
past 20 years, the borders of the so-called “rich” states have been transformed
under the influence of international  migratory flows, as a result  of which they
modified  their  installations  and  created  new surveillance  measures.  Migratory
barriers  are  no  longer  a  unique  external  element  of  territories;  today,  they
materialize through a series of obstacles that intersperse the path of those exiled in
the  search  of  a  better  life  or  of  protection  in  a  state  other  than  their  own’
(Blanchard E., Clochard O. & Rodier C., 2010, pp.6-7). 
It is important to understand the dramatic consequences of the governance of the external limits of
the  EU,  which  is  supported  by  more  and  more  powerful  technology. Even  if  it  is  difficult  to
understand the totality of this tragedy, cartography can be useful here.
2. A cartographic overview of these tragedies
The map showing the number of migrants that have died at Europe's borders was published in a
large number of books, both scientific and press articles, and was also used in Web documentaries
and films. It is used to remind us that what happens at the EU borders is not merely fatalities but the
product of political  intentions,  namely to prevent men, women and children from accessing the
territory of the European Union (EU). Even if this map has gained notoriety among campaigns and
institutional networks, universities and even schools, it has not prompted deep change in European
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migratory  policy.  It  can  also  be  used  by  some writers  in  a  way  that  is  contrary  to  its  initial
conception.  How  many  times  have  we  heard  that  it  is  important  to  reflect  on  new  means  of
surveillance in order to avoid such tragedies? Consequently, the strengthening of border controls
continues. Unfortunately, this has done little to reduce the number of tragedies in the Mediterranean
Sea. We must also be mindful that the deadly borders of the European Union (EU) go much farther
than only its external borders. The collaborations put into place between the EU, its member states
and neighboring countries – Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal –
push the police forces in these countries to commit criminal offences (see below) that often go
unpunished.
So how can we project this European border via a map? As we have seen already, this cannot be
summed  up  merely  by  tracing  a  simple  line  (like  the  Schengen  Area,  for  example)  that  is
supposedly protected by barriers and border guards. This migratory border, whose particularity is
that it is for the most part maritime and materializes by measures that do not stop moving, cannot be
represented by an official outline but rather via its practical aspect and the effects it produces. By a
phenomenological approach, we will use different maps to show the tragic events that migratory
controls  lead  to  each year, namely  the migrants  (men,  women and children)  who have died at
Europe's  borders,  and  thus  try  to  produce  a  new political  and  subjective  outlook  of  Europe’s
migratory border.   
2.1 Maps used in the fight against deadly policies
- counting the number of deaths during migration
There is no official data concerning the number of migrants who have died at the borders of the
European Union. However, via the press and other media, we know that among the thousands of
people seeking asylum in Europe, who flee countries that are in crisis or because of war, some never
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reach their destination. According to the European network UNITED for Intercultural Action, which
has collected data from the press since 1993, the number of refugees, asylum seekers or migrants
that have died trying to reach the EU borders has peaked at nearly 18,000 people. This database,
which also contains the number of deaths following deportation, clearly shows a large progressive
increase that peaked at nearly 2,000 deaths in 2011. At first sight, the different critical analyses of
European migratory policy show that this evolution corresponds with a real increase that, however,
is not devoid of statistical bias linked to growing attention by the media toward this issue. In fact,
better  media  coverage  has  indisputably  created  a  mediatized  magnifying  or  probe  effect  that
complicates  the  construction  of  relatively  objective  measures.  By  contrast,  there  are  certainly
situations that have not been able to be identified, such as those of the numerous migrants who died
of dehydration in the Sahara. It is for this reason we are working here not on the evolution of this
phenomenon but rather on the representation of the number of deaths since 1993. These figures
represent only a small drop in the ocean compared with the bloodbath that should be at the heart of
all policy.
Developed collectively from information that is difficult to locate with precision (many events took
place at sea), the ‘géocodage’xx of the information, which is a prerequisite for the creation of these
maps, was not an easy task. The events collected by the press are often located either with precision
or very approximately (for example, ‘in the desert’, or ‘between the Libyan coastline and Italy’),
and  we were  therefore  obligated  to  take  certain  precautions  when processing  this  information.
Nonetheless, the cartographic depiction of the events at Europe’s borders put forward in this article
was designed to produce an overview of these events. The uncertainty surrounding localization will
largely be compensated by a higher level of aggregation.
In 2003, the first map showing border deaths was published in Les cahiers d’Outre-mer (Clochard,
2003), then in 2004 and subsequent years it was distributed, incorporating more information, by Le
Monde  diplomatique  (Clochard  &  Rekacewicz,  2006).  The  mapping  of  this  database  was
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subsequently updated on several occasionsxxi. If the aggregated approach used by this map has the
disadvantage of dissolving individual stories into a global representation, these maps nonetheless
have the advantage of producing an overview that allows the reader to comprehend where these
events take place. Over the course of these updates, this map outlining the number of deaths was
transformed in order to successively underline the different  border crossings in Europe that  are
becoming more and more perilous and consequently more and more deadly. Thus, even if on the
first maps that appeared in 2003 and 2004, the number of migrant deaths reached nearly 3,000 in
the region of Gibraltar, successive updates have allowed us to observe a displacement  of these
tragedies  toward  the  Canary  Islands  and then  toward  the  central  Mediterranean  region,  around
Lampedusa and the Strait of Sicily. This map represents the information gathered for the period
1993–2012 and distinctly shows an aggregated vision of the three centers of activity. Moreover, by
breaking down these events on the maps according to the cause of death, different circles, both large
or small, distinguish between those people who drowned, committed suicide, suffocated, starved or
froze to death, died in fires, or were poisoned. Ultimately, the map gives us a radical and dissenting
image of European migratory policy, which is deemed to be responsible for this situation.
Other representations of this database have also been made. Some of the maps produced for  Le
Monde  diplomatiquexxii or  in  the  framework  of  the  European  project  ESPON  Cartographic
Languagexxiii (Lambert, Ysebaert, & Zanin, 2013) pay particular attention to the subjective aspect of
cartographic representation by portraying the map not from a bird's eye view but rather from a
migrant’s point of view. By orientating the projection of the map, which allows it to be shown at an
angle  so  that  gives  the  impression  of  observing  Europe  from  Africa,  the  representation,  thus
devised,  puts  forward  as  many  vast  red  circles  as  the  insurmountable  barriers  erected  by  the
European  Union  against  migrants.  However,  even  with  these  two  examples,  it  remains  a
conventional cartographic representation based on classical mapping techniques and proportional
circles. Other mapping techniques remain unexplored.  
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-  Toward  the  production  of  an  approach  combining  cartography  and  the  study  of  migratory
policies? 
When Paul Ariès first used the term ‘degrowth’ (décroissance), he referred to it as a ‘mot obus’, or
‘bombshell word’. According to him, it is designed to question and to definitively enter into public
debate this term that may be deemed shocking, but its sensational side forces each person to give
their opinion. The term ‘degrowth’ (décroissance) is a sort of dissension, which was conceived in
order  ‘to  pulverize  the  dominant  way  of  thinking’  (Aries,  2004).  Therefore,  putting  forward
graphically and aesthetically an idea that is not neutral, the maps can also be ‘obus’ or bombshells;
in fact, they are even designed for that. Reality is complex, plural and marked by contradictory
interests; it  cannot be mapped in its entirety. In order to carry its message, the map must make
abstract but also summarize and caricature. By classing the information, enlarging some elements
and keeping some quiet, as is done in the press, the geographical map is ultimately a discursive
object  that  serves to  construct  a  discussion.  To create  a map is  to  affirm a view, and it  is  this
confrontation of different viewpoints that causes the debate. It is therefore necessary to put on the
table  the  maps  that  can  be  considered  an  ‘obus’  in  order  to  create  a  radical  and  dissenting
cartographic overview of European migratory borders.      
Using potential theory, a simple mathematical process allows us to calculate in any area the value of
an absolute quantitative variable localized in its surroundings. By fixing the form and the range of
these  surroundings,  we can  produce a  simplified  and generalized  image  (Didelon,  Grasland,  &
Richard, 2008) of this geographical phenomenon (Plumjeau et al., 2007). By varying the range of
this  function (adjustment/flattening of the Gaussian integral),  we obtain a  representation  that  is
more or less ‘generalized’, allowing us to visualize at a single glance the large spatial structures and
– in the zones that are of particular interest to us – the most devastating zones in this fight against
migrants.
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Moreover,  the  display  of  these maps in  3D allows the  relevant  gradients  to  be  represented  by
gradients (slopes) that are more or less steep and cannot be understood on a map that is ‘flat’ (in
2D). The relief also helps us to understand the numbers represented, as the height allows us to see,
at a single glance, the amplitude of the peaks, and consequently to compare them with each other. It
is on this basis that we have built the following maps. By applying this to our database on the deaths
at the EU borders, this process allows us to produce five levels of spreading the information that
will be mapped on the following pages.
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Figure 7.1 Cartographic generalization (potential method)
2.2 Cartographic metaphors or an effigy of a scattered reality?
A map is interesting insofar as it has something to say and is ‘eloquent.’ With the following maps,
we will seek to tell a story – a cartographic narrative. Using press images, we want to make the
different aspects of European migratory policy a reality by using these ‘cartographic metaphors’ and
imbuing them with our imagination. In the same way a poignant novel can teach us as much about
the real world as a rigorous and well-argued essay, we use metaphorical forms in order to see the
true aspects of European migratory policy. It is a question of subjective and radical representations
of the borders, but which are no less accurate than more conventional representations. Therefore,
three cartographic accounts, created from the same data as the maps already presented above, will
be presented below. Even if the first Schengen convention dates to 1985, the Schengen Area was
progressively established during the mid-1990s and institutionalized at  a European level  by the
Treaty of Amsterdam on October 2, 1997. It currently comprises 28 member states. According to
the different European governments, the area of free movement inside the EU can only be tangible
if Europe is able to effectively ‘protect’ its external borders. In order to ensure the longevity of this
area of free movement and to reassure the member states,  the Schengen Area was built  on the
drastic exclusion of foreigners who did not have the relevant authorization to enter or to live in this
territory. European policy on visas – one of the first measures to be put into place – is characterized
by a managerial  and police-related approach to border control, which is based on the notion of
‘migratory risk’ (Migreurop, 2013).
The map below was developed in the following way:  The method of  using potential  theory is
stabilized  by  using  one  scale  of  500  kilometers  in  order  to  produce  a  standardized  image
represented by red contour lines (isolines). We calculated the ridge line and then drew it in three
dimensions  with  the  help  of  a  GIS  (geographic  information  system).  This  line  showing  the
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maximum mortality separating Europe and Africa was then extruded in order to constitute a fence
rising up as a migratory ‘Iron Curtain’. This ‘classic’ symbolism that we also find in press drawings
represents the defensive walls of a Europe that will protect itself at any cost against the hordes of
migrants.
Even if this linear representation of the borders is in part a fantasy, it is no less true in certain areas.
In fact, the policy of ‘securing borders’ led by the EU also appears in the construction of walls like
in the case of Ceuta, Melilla, and in the region of Evros in Greece. Moreover, in areas of the eastern
borders, much more sophisticated protective measures than those used during the Cold War have
been put in place,  notably in Estonia and Bulgaria.  However, these walls are ineffective in the
medium and long terms, and they mainly play a discursive role. According to Wendy Brown, they
can even be considered as one of the symptoms of a decline in state sovereignty in a world that
wants to be ‘more and more open’ (Brown, 2009).
Built  where  migratory  tensions  are  at  their  highest,  these walls  are  often  disaster  zones  where
human tragedy takes place. In 2005, a total of 17 migrants were shot dead in front of the walls that
surround the Spanish exclaves  of Ceuta (11 deaths) and Melilla (6 deaths).  Hundreds of migrants
were injured,  and others were deported to the desert without any care or supplies. This wall of
shame, which is also where Khady Demba dies in the story told by Marie Ndiaye in her book Three
Strong Women, is represented on the map (NDiaye, 2009).
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Figure 7.2 Europe, the ‘fortress’
The migratory paths change, but the tragedies remain. An astute analysis of the database over time
shows us that the strengthening of border controls set up by border control agencies and Frontex
using nearly military-style measures does not contain these migratory flows but rather pushes them
to use more dangerous routes. After Gibraltar and the Canary Islands, the most migrants now perish
in the center of the Mediterranean.
By  fixing  the  cartographic  spread  at  200  kilometers,  a  Mediterranean  whirlpool  appears:  an
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enormous chasm in which over 6,000 migrants have drowned since 1993, in particular off the coast
of  Libya  and Tunisia,  and closer  to  Malta  and Lampedusa.  This  Mediterranean  whirlpool  is  a
possible  representation  of  the  European  ‘migratory  border’.  Far  from the  image  of  this  ‘mère
méditerranée’xxiv described by Edgar Morin in 1995 as ‘a place where it is still possible to reinvent a
convivial economy’xxv; this maritime zone has become a storm zone and a cemetery for immigrants.
In May 2000, 32 refugees died after  their  ship was wrecked near Tangiers.  The authorities  did
nothing to help them. In 2008, 36 Africans, including four babies, drowned after the Moroccan
coastguard had punctured their inflatable dinghy with a knife.
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Figure 7.3 The Mediterranean Whirlpool
‘Europe kills’ was  the  title  of  an article  published in  the  newspaper  Libération  on  October  4,
2013xxvi, written by the heads of different organizations that care for migrants and seek the defense
of human rights, after more drownings off the coast of Lampedusa that caused the deaths of nearly
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300 people. This tragedy could have been avoided, but Europe is locked in a war with migrants. The
EU borders have become a battlefield, which is more than a simple front but is complicated and
spread  out.  The  setting  up  of  a  plethora  of  virtually  military  measures  (planes,  helicopter,
speedboats,  infrared  detectors,  etc.)  –  like  those  used  by Frontex,  and which fall  under  border
control policy as well as annual budgetsxxvii allocated for the fight against illegal immigration – is
there to remind us of this fact.
By fixing the cartographic spread at 500 kilometers, we can see the creation of a mound whose
summit is situated in the center of the Mediterranean region. This mound, red like the blood spilled
in  this  area,  is  produced  by  the  number  of  deaths  of  migrants  trying  to  reach  Europe.  This
representation by ‘geomorphology’ symbolizes the idea of an accumulation of years and years of
forgotten victims of a war that we never hear about. This representation of a migratory bloodbath
has reached a level that we could never measure with complete accuracy.  
This red mound obviously makes reference to the bloody episode of the First  World War (The
Bapaume mound) that is taken from the famous anti-war song written by Montéhus. By extension,
the migratory red mound is also an appeal to stop this invisible war against migrants.  
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Figure 7.4 The migratory red mound
Conclusion
In the framework of  political  and operational  partnerships  that  the EU has  established with its
neighbors, it happens more and more that the union exports these border controls whose locations
are constantly modified at the mercy of its needs. This externalization that falls within the external
territories of the EU is equally consolidated by the presence of Frontex or the Eurosur system.
There is also the fact that the European authorities are still not respecting the law of the sea and the
decisions taken by the highest jurisdictions. These many points are well and truly the cause of the
installation of these arbitrary lines and tragic situations. Thus, for more than the past 20 years, the
Mediterranean Sea, such a beautiful natural object, has become lethal because of denied visas or the
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absence of rescue services, although in some cases the authorities would have been informed of the
situations  if  boat  people  found  themselves  in  distress.  Fernand  Braudel  wrote  that  the
Mediterranean Sea was a ‘succession of seas’, and we can say that the Mediterranean Sea is not the
same for everyone: There is one for tourists, one for transport and one as a borderxxviii, where several
hundreds of migrants drown to death each year during their crossings.
Just like press drawings, the map is an effective way of shedding light on these events. Without
refuting the scientific foundations linked to the cartographic construction that this article never calls
into question, the map must integrate the fact that it was designed as a way of communicating this
information, whose function is to establish a clear, understandable and therefore also an exaggerated
message. Maps have the power to communicate subjectively from a complex geographical reality;
finally, showing an overview of the world can allow us to change the world itself. The map being a
real representation of events, taking action through this representation in its current form is a way of
influencing our collective representation of the world. In An atlas of radical cartography, Maribel
Casas-Cortés and Sebastan Cobarrubias show how subversive map of these borders helps to create
subversive borders (Casas-Cortes & Cobbarubias, 2007). By twisting Marx’s method, we can say
that cartography is not only there to understand and interpret the world but also to transform it.
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